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SHARM EL-SHEIKH
FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE
Date : April 30, 2001
The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
Dear Mr. President,
We enclose herewith the report of the Sharm el-Sheikh
Fact-Finding Committee.
We sought and received information and advice from a wide range
of individuals, organizations, and governments. However, the
conclusions and recommendations are ours alone.
We are grateful for the support that you and your administration
have provided to the Committee.
Respectfully,
Suleyman Demirel
Thorbjoern Jagland
Warren B. Rudman
Javier Solana
George J Mitchell, Chairman
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The Government of Israel (GOI) and the Palestinian Authority
(PA) must act swiftly and decisively to halt the violence. Their
immediate objectives then should be to rebuild confidence and
resume negotiations.
During this mission our aim has been to fulfill the mandate
agreed at Sharm el-Sheikh. We value the support given our work
by the participants at the summit, and we commend the parties
for their cooperation. Our principal recommendation is that they
recommit themselves to the Sharm el-Sheikh spirit and that they
implement the decisions made there in 1999 and 2000. We believe
that the summit participants will support bold action by the
parties to achieve these objectives.
The restoration of trust is essential, and the parties should
take affirmative steps to this end. Given the high level of
hostility and mistrust, the timing and sequence of these steps
are obviously crucial. This can be decided only by the parties.
We urge them to begin the process of decision immediately.
Accordingly, we recommend that steps be taken to:
END THE VIOLENCE
The GOI and the PA should reaffirm their commitment to existing
agreements and undertakings and should immediately implement an
unconditional cessation of violence.
The GOI and PA should immediately resume security cooperation.
REBUILD CONFIDENCE
The PA and GOI should work together to establish a meaningful
"cooling off period" and implement additional confidence
building measures, some of which were detailed in the October
2000 Sharm el-Sheikh Statement and some of which were offered by
the U.S. on January 7, 2001 in Cairo (see Recommendations
section for further description).
The PA and GOI should resume their efforts to identify, condemn
and discourage incitement in all its forms.
The PA should make clear through concrete action to Palestinians
and Israelis alike that terrorism is reprehensible and
unacceptable, and that the PA will make a 100 percent effort to
prevent terrorist operations and to punish perpetrators. This
effort should include immediate steps to apprehend and
incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA's jurisdiction.
The GOI should freeze all settlement activity, including the
"natural growth" of existing settlements.
The GOI should ensure that the IDF adopt and enforce policies
and procedures encouraging non-lethal responses to unarmed
demonstrators, with a view to minimizing casualties and friction
between the two communities.
The PA should prevent gunmen from using Palestinian populated
areas to fire upon Israeli populated areas and IDF positions.
This tactic places civilians on both sides at unnecessary risk.
The GOI should lift closures, transfer to the PA all tax
revenues owed, and permit Palestinians who had been employed in
Israel to return to their jobs; and should ensure that security
forces and settlers refrain from the destruction of homes and
roads, as well as trees and other agricultural property in
Palestinian areas. We acknowledge the GOI's position that
actions of this nature have been taken for security reasons.
Nevertheless, the economic effects will persist for years.
The PA should renew cooperation with Israeli security agencies
to ensure, to the maximum extent possible, that Palestinian
workers employed within Israel are fully vetted and free of
connections to organizations and individuals engaged in
terrorism.
The PA and GOI should consider a joint undertaking to preserve
and protect holy places sacred to the traditions of Jews,
Muslims, and Christians.
The GOI and PA should jointly endorse and support the work of
Palestinian and Israeli non- governmental organizations involved
in cross-community initiatives linking the two peoples.
RESUME NEGOTIATIONS
In the spirit of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreements and
understandings of 1999 and 2000, we recommend that the parties
meet to reaffirm their commitment to signed agreements and
mutual understandings, and take corresponding action. This
should be the basis for resuming full and meaningful
negotiations.
INTRODUCTION
On October 17, 2000, at the conclusion of the Middle East Peace
Summit at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, the President of the United
States spoke on behalf of the participants (the Government of
Israel, the Palestinian Authority, the Governments of Egypt,
Jordan, and the United States, the United Nations, and the
European Union). Among other things, the President stated that:
The United States will develop with the Israelis and
Palestinians, as well as in consultation with the United Nations
Secretary General, a committee of fact-finding on the events of
the past several weeks and how to prevent their recurrence. The
committee's report will be shared by the U.S. President with the
U.N. Secretary General and the parties prior to publication. A
final report shall be submitted under the auspices of the U.S.
President for publication.1
On November 7, 2000, following consultations with the other
participants, the President asked us to serve on what has come
to be known as the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee. In a
letter to us on December 6, 2000, the President stated that:
The purpose of the Summit, and of the agreement that ensued, was
to end the violence, to prevent its recurrence, and to find a
path back to the peace process. In its actions and mode of
operation, therefore, the Committee should be guided by these
overriding goals ... The Committee should strive to steer clear
of any step that will intensify mutual blame and finger-pointing
between the parties. As I noted in my previous letter, "the
Committee should not become a divisive force or a focal point
for blame and recrimination but rather should serve to forestall
violence and confrontation and provide lessons for the future."
This should not be a tribunal whose purpose is to determine the
guilt or innocence of individuals or of the parties; rather, it
should be a fact-finding committee whose purpose is to determine
what happened and how to avoid it recurring in the future.2
After our first meeting, held before we visited the region, we
urged an end to all violence. Our meetings and our observations
during our subsequent visits to the region have intensified our
convictions in this regard. Whatever the source, violence will
not solve the problems of the region. It will only make them
worse. Death and destruction will not bring peace, but will
deepen the hatred and harden the resolve on both sides. There is
only one way to peace, justice, and security in the Middle East,
and that is through negotiation.
Despite their long history and close proximity, some Israelis
and Palestinians seem not to fully appreciate each other's
problems and concerns. Some Israelis appear not to comprehend
the humiliation and frustration that Palestinians must endure
every day as a result of living with the continuing effects of
occupation, sustained by the presence of Israeli military forces
and settlements in their midst, or the determination of the
Palestinians to achieve independence and genuine
self-determination. Some Palestinians appear not to comprehend
the extent to which terrorism creates fear among the Israeli
people and undermines their belief in the possibility of
co-existence, or the determination of the GOI to do whatever is
necessary to protect its people.
Fear, hate, anger, and frustration have risen on both sides. The
greatest danger of all is that the culture of peace, nurtured
over the previous decade, is being shattered. In its place there
is a growing sense of futility and despair, and a growing resort
to violence.
Political leaders on both sides must act and speak decisively to
reverse these dangerous trends; they must rekindle the desire
and the drive for peace. That will be difficult. But it can be
done and it must be done, for the alternative is unacceptable
and should be unthinkable.
Two proud peoples share a land and a destiny. Their competing
claims and religious differences have led to a grinding,
demoralizing, dehumanizing conflict. They can continue in
conflict or they can negotiate to find a way to live
side-by-side in peace.
There is a record of achievement. In 1991 the first peace
conference with Israelis and Palestinians took place in Madrid
to achieve peace based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242
and 338. In 1993, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
and Israel met in Oslo for the first face-to-face negotiations;
they led to mutual recognition and the Declaration of Principles
(signed by the parties in Washington, D.C. on September 13,
1993), which provided a road map to reach the destination agreed
in Madrid. Since then, important steps have been taken in Cairo,
in Washington, and elsewhere. Last year the parties came very
close to a permanent settlement.
So much has been achieved. So much is at risk. If the parties
are to succeed in completing their journey to their common
destination, agreed commitments must be implemented,
international law respected, and human rights protected. We
encourage them to return to negotiations, however difficult. It
is the only path to peace, justice and security.
DISCUSSION
It is clear from their statements that the participants in the
summit of last October hoped and intended that the outbreak of
violence, then less than a month old, would soon end. The U.S.
President's letters to us, asking that we make recommendations
on how to prevent a recurrence of violence, reflect that
intention.
Yet the violence has not ended. It has worsened. Thus the
overriding concern of those in the region with whom we spoke is
to end the violence and to return to the process of shaping a
sustainable peace. That is what we were told, and were asked to
address, by Israelis and Palestinians alike. It was the message
conveyed to us as well by President Mubarak of Egypt, King
Abdullah of Jordan, and UN Secretary General Annan.
Their concern must be ours. If our report is to have effect, it
must deal with the situation that exists, which is different
from that envisaged by the summit participants. In this report,
we will try to answer the questions assigned to us by the Sharm
el-Sheikh summit: What happened? Why did it happen?
In light of the current situation, however, we must elaborate on
the third part of our mandate: How can the recurrence of
violence be prevented? The relevance and impact of our work, in
the end, will be measured by the recommendations we make
concerning the following:
Ending the Violence.
Rebuilding Confidence.
Resuming Negotiations.
WHAT HAPPENED?
We are not a tribunal. We complied with the request that we not
determine the guilt or innocence of individuals or of the
parties. We did not have the power to compel the testimony of
witnesses or the production of documents. Most of the
information we received came from the parties and,
understandably, it largely tended to support their arguments.
In this part of our report, we do not attempt to chronicle all
of the events from late September 2000 onward. Rather, we
discuss only those that shed light on the underlying causes of
violence.
In late September 2000, Israeli, Palestinian, and other
officials received reports that Member of the Knesset (now Prime
Minister) Ariel Sharon was planning a visit to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple
Mount in Jerusalem. Palestinian and U.S. officials urged then
Prime Minister Ehud Barak to prohibit the visit.3 Mr. Barak told
us that he believed the visit was intended to be an internal
political act directed against him by a political opponent, and
he declined to prohibit it.
Mr. Sharon made the visit on September 28 accompanied by over
1,000 Israeli police officers. Although Israelis viewed the
visit in an internal political context, Palestinians saw it as
highly provocative to them. On the following day, in the same
place, a large number of unarmed Palestinian demonstrators and a
large Israeli police contingent confronted each other. According
to the U.S. Department of State, "Palestinians held large
demonstrations and threw stones at police in the vicinity of the
Western Wall. Police used rubber-coated metal bullets and live
ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing 4 persons and
injuring about 200."4 According to the GOI, 14 Israeli policemen
were injured.5
Similar demonstrations took place over the following several
days.6 Thus began what has become known as the "Al-Aqsa
Intifada" (Al-Aqsa being a mosque at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple
Mount).
The GOI asserts that the immediate catalyst for the violence was
the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations on July 25, 2000
and the "widespread appreciation in the international community
of Palestinian responsibility for the impasse."7 In this view,
Palestinian violence was planned by the PA leadership, and was
aimed at "provoking and incurring Palestinian casualties as a
means of regaining the diplomatic initiative."8
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) denies the
allegation that the intifada was planned. It claims, however,
that "Camp David represented nothing less than an attempt by
Israel to extend the force it exercises on the ground to
negotiations,"9 and that "the failure of the summit, and the
attempts to allocate blame on the Palestinian side only added to
the tension on the ground..."10
From the perspective of the PLO, Israel responded to the
disturbances with excessive and illegal use of deadly force
against demonstrators; behavior which, in the PLO's view,
reflected Israel's contempt for the lives and safety of
Palestinians. For Palestinians, the widely seen images of the
killing of 12-year-old Muhammad al Durra in Gaza on September
30, shot as he huddled behind his father, reinforced that
perception.
From the perspective of the GOI, the demonstrations were
organized and directed by the Palestinian leadership to create
sympathy for their cause around the world by provoking Israeli
security forces to fire upon demonstrators, especially young
people. For Israelis, the lynching of two military reservists,
First Sgt. Vadim Novesche and First Cpl. Yosef Avrahami, in
Ramallah on October 12, reflected a deep-seated Palestinian
hatred of Israel and Jews.
What began as a series of confrontations between Palestinian
demonstrators and Israeli security forces, which resulted in the
GOI's initial restrictions on the movement of people and goods
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (closures), has since evolved
into a wider array of violent actions and responses. There have
been exchanges of fire between built-up areas, sniping incidents
and clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians. There
have also been terrorist acts and Israeli reactions thereto
(characterized by the GOI as counter-terrorism), including
killings, further destruction of property and economic measures.
Most recently, there have been mortar attacks on Israeli
locations and IDF ground incursions into Palestinian areas.
From the Palestinian perspective, the decision of Israel to
characterize the current crisis as "an armed conflict short of
war"11 is simply a means "to justify its assassination policy,
its collective punishment policy, and its use of lethal
force."12 From the Israeli perspective, "The Palestinian
leadership have instigated, orchestrated and directed the
violence. It has used, and continues to use, terror and
attrition as strategic tools."13
In their submissions, the parties traded allegations about the
motivation and degree of control exercised by the other.
However, we were provided with no persuasive evidence that the
Sharon visit was anything other than an internal political act;
neither were we provided with persuasive evidence that the PA
planned the uprising.
Accordingly, we have no basis on which to conclude that there
was a deliberate plan by the PA to initiate a campaign of
violence at the first opportunity; or to conclude that there was
a deliberate plan by the GOI to respond with lethal force.
However, there is also no evidence on which to conclude that the
PA made a consistent effort to contain the demonstrations and
control the violence once it began; or that the GOI made a
consistent effort to use non-lethal means to control
demonstrations of unarmed Palestinians. Amid rising anger, fear,
and mistrust, each side assumed the worst about the other and
acted accordingly.
The Sharon visit did not cause the "Al-Aqsa Intifada." But it
was poorly timed and the provocative effect should have been
foreseen; indeed it was foreseen by those who urged that the
visit be prohibited. More significant were the events that
followed: the decision of the Israeli police on September 29 to
use lethal means against the Palestinian demonstrators; and the
subsequent failure, as noted above, of either party to exercise
restraint.
WHY DID IT HAPPEN?
The roots of the current violence extend much deeper than an
inconclusive summit conference. Both sides have made clear a
profound disillusionment with the behavior of the other in
failing to meet the expectations arising from the peace process
launched in Madrid in 1991 and then in Oslo in 1993. Each side
has accused the other of violating specific undertakings and
undermining the spirit of their commitment to resolving their
political differences peacefully.
Divergent Expectations: We are struck by the divergent
expectations expressed by the parties relating to the
implementation of the Oslo process. Results achieved from this
process were unthinkable less than 10 years ago. During the
latest round of negotiations, the parties were closer to a
permanent settlement than ever before.
Nonetheless, Palestinians and Israelis alike told us that the
premise on which the Oslo process is based that tackling the
hard "permanent status" issues be deferred to the end of the
process has gradually come under serious pressure. The
step-by-step process agreed to by the parties was based on the
assumption that each step in the negotiating process would lead
to enhanced trust and confidence. To achieve this, each party
would have to implement agreed upon commitments and abstain from
actions that would be seen by the other as attempts to abuse the
process in order to predetermine the shape of the final outcome.
If this requirement is not met, the Oslo road map cannot
successfully lead to its agreed destination. Today, each side
blames the other for having ignored this fundamental aspect,
resulting in a crisis in confidence. This problem became even
more pressing with the opening of permanent status talks.
The GOI has placed primacy on moving toward a Permanent Status
Agreement in a nonviolent atmosphere, consistent with
commitments contained in the agreements between the parties.
"Even if slower than was initially envisaged, there has, since
the start of the peace process in Madrid in 1991, been steady
progress towards the goal of a Permanent Status Agreement
without the resort to violence on a scale that has characterized
recent weeks."14 The "goal" is the Permanent Status Agreement,
the terms of which must be negotiated by the parties.
The PLO view is that delays in the process have been the result
of an Israeli attempt to prolong and solidify the occupation.
Palestinians "believed that the Oslo process would yield an end
to Israeli occupation in five years,"15 the timeframe for the
transitional period specified in the Declaration of Principles.
Instead there have been, in the PLO's view, repeated Israeli
delays culminating in the Camp David summit, where, "Israel
proposed to annex about 11.2% of the West Bank (excluding
Jerusalem)..." and offered unacceptable proposals concerning
Jerusalem, security and refugees. "In sum, Israel's proposals at
Camp David provided for Israel's annexation of the best
Palestinian lands, the perpetuation of Israeli control over East
Jerusalem, a continued Israeli military presence on Palestinian
territory, Israeli control over Palestinian natural resources,
airspace and borders, and the return of fewer than 1% of
refugees to their homes."16
Both sides see the lack of full compliance with agreements
reached since the opening of the peace process as evidence of a
lack of good faith. This conclusion led to an erosion of trust
even before the permanent status negotiations began.
Divergent Perspectives: During the last seven months, these
views have hardened into divergent realities. Each side views
the other as having acted in bad faith; as having turned the
optimism of Oslo into the suffering and grief of victims and
their loved ones. In their statements and actions, each side
demonstrates a perspective that fails to recognize any truth in
the perspective of the other.
The Palestinian Perspective: For the Palestinian side, "Madrid"
and "Oslo" heralded the prospect of a State, and guaranteed an
end to the occupation and a resolution of outstanding matters
within an agreed time frame. Palestinians are genuinely angry at
the continued growth of settlements and at their daily
experiences of humiliation and disruption as a result of
Israel's presence in the Palestinian territories. Palestinians
see settlers and settlements in their midst not only as
violating the spirit of the Oslo process, but also as an
application of force in the form of Israel's overwhelming
military superiority, which sustains and protects the
settlements.
The Interim Agreement provides that "the two parties view the
West Bank and Gaza as a single territorial unit, the integrity
and status of which will be preserved during the interim
period." Coupled with this, the Interim Agreement's prohibition
on taking steps which may prejudice permanent status
negotiations denies Israel the right to continue its illegal
expansionist settlement policy. In addition to the Interim
Agreement, customary international law, including the Fourth
Geneva Convention, prohibits Israel (as an occupying power) from
establishing settlements in occupied territory pending an end to
the conflict.17
The PLO alleges that Israeli political leaders "have made no
secret of the fact that the Israeli interpretation of Oslo was
designed to segregate the Palestinians in non-contiguous
enclaves, surrounded by Israeli military-controlled borders,
with settlements and settlement roads violating the territories'
integrity."18 According to the PLO, "In the seven years since
the [Declaration of Principles], the settler population in the
West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, has
doubled to 200,000, and the settler population in East Jerusalem
has risen to 170,000. Israel has constructed approximately 30
new settlements, and expanded a number of existing ones to house
these new settlers."19
The PLO also claims that the GOI has failed to comply with other
commitments such as the further withdrawal from the West Bank
and the release of Palestinian prisoners. In addition,
Palestinians expressed frustration with the impasse over
refugees and the deteriorating economic circumstances in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The Israeli Perspective: From the GOI perspective, the expansion
of settlement activity and the taking of measures to facilitate
the convenience and safety of settlers do not prejudice the
outcome of permanent status negotiations.
Israel understands that the Palestinian side objects to the
settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Without
prejudice to the formal status of the settlements, Israel
accepts that the settlements are an outstanding issue on which
there will have to be agreement as part of any permanent status
resolution between the sides. This point was acknowledged and
agreed upon in the Declaration of Principles of 13 September
1993 as well as in other agreements between the two sides. There
has in fact been a good deal of discussion on the question of
settlements between the two sides in the various negotiations
toward a permanent status agreement.20
Indeed, Israelis point out that at the Camp David summit and
during subsequent talks the GOI offered to make significant
concessions with respect to settlements in the context of an
overall agreement.
Security, however, is the key GOI concern. The GOI maintains
that the PLO has breached its solemn commitments by continuing
the use of violence in the pursuit of political objectives.
"Israel's principal concern in the peace process has been
security. This issue is of overriding importance... [S]ecurity
is not something on which Israel will bargain or compromise. The
failure of the Palestinian side to comply with both the letter
and spirit of the security provisions in the various agreements
has long been a source of disturbance in Israel."21
According to the GOI, the Palestinian failure takes several
forms: institutionalized anti-Israel, anti-Jewish incitement;
the release from detention of terrorists; the failure to control
illegal weapons; and the actual conduct of violent operations,
ranging from the insertion of riflemen into demonstrations to
terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians. The GOI maintains that
the PLO has explicitly violated its renunciation of terrorism
and other acts of violence,22 thereby significantly eroding
trust between the parties. The GOI perceives "a thread, implied
but nonetheless clear, that runs throughout the Palestinian
submissions. It is that Palestinian violence against Israel and
Israelis is somehow explicable, understandable, legitimate."23
END THE VIOLENCE
For Israelis and Palestinians alike the experience of the past
several months has been intensely personal. Through
relationships of kinship, friendship, religion, community and
profession, virtually everyone in both societies has a link to
someone who has been killed or seriously injured in the recent
violence. We were touched by their stories. During our last
visit to the region, we met with the families of Palestinian and
Israeli victims. These individual accounts of grief were
heart-rending and indescribably sad. Israeli and Palestinian
families used virtually the same words to describe their grief.
When the widow of a murdered Israeli physician a man of peace
whose practice included the treatment of Arab patients tells
us that it seems that Palestinians are interested in killing
Jews for the sake of killing Jews, Palestinians should take
notice. When the parents of a Palestinian child killed while in
his bed by an errant .50 caliber bullet draw similar conclusions
about the respect accorded by Israelis to Palestinian lives,
Israelis need to listen. When we see the shattered bodies of
children we know it is time for adults to stop the violence.
With widespread violence, both sides have resorted to portrayals
of the other in hostile stereotypes. This cycle cannot be easily
broken. Without considerable determination and readiness to
compromise, the rebuilding of trust will be impossible.
Cessation of Violence: Since 1991, the parties have consistently
committed themselves, in all their agreements, to the path of
nonviolence. They did so most recently in the two Sharm
el-Sheikh summits of September 1999 and October 2000. To stop
the violence now, the PA and GOI need not "reinvent the wheel."
Rather, they should take immediate steps to end the violence,
reaffirm their mutual commitments, and resume negotiations.
Resumption of Security Cooperation: Palestinian security
officials told us that it would take some time perhaps several
weeks - for the PA to reassert full control over armed elements
nominally under its command and to exert decisive influence over
other armed elements operating in Palestinian areas. Israeli
security officials have not disputed these assertions. What is
important is that the PA make an all-out effort to enforce a
complete cessation of violence and that it be clearly seen by
the GOI as doing so. The GOI must likewise exercise a 100
percent effort to ensure that potential friction points, where
Palestinians come into contact with armed Israelis, do not
become stages for renewed hostilities.
The collapse of security cooperation in early October reflected
the belief by each party that the other had committed itself to
a violent course of action. If the parties wish to attain the
standard of 100 percent effort to prevent violence, the
immediate resumption of security cooperation is mandatory.
We acknowledge the reluctance of the PA to be seen as
facilitating the work of Israeli security services absent an
explicit political context (i.e., meaningful negotiations) and
under the threat of Israeli settlement expansion. Indeed,
security cooperation cannot be sustained without such
negotiations and with ongoing actions seen as prejudicing the
outcome of negotiations. However, violence is much more likely
to continue without security cooperation. Moreover, without
effective security cooperation, the parties will continue to
regard all acts of violence as officially sanctioned.
In order to overcome the current deadlock, the parties should
consider how best to revitalize security cooperation. We commend
current efforts to that end. Effective cooperation depends on
recreating and sustaining an atmosphere of confidence and good
personal relations. It is for the parties themselves to
undertake the main burden of day-to-day cooperation, but they
should remain open to engaging the assistance of others in
facilitating that work. Such outside assistance should be by
mutual consent, should not threaten good bilateral working
arrangements, and should not act as a tribunal or interpose
between the parties. There was good security cooperation until
last year that benefited from the good offices of the U.S.
(acknowledged by both sides as useful), and was also supported
indirectly by security projects and assistance from the European
Union. The role of outside assistance should be that of creating
the appropriate framework, sustaining goodwill on both sides,
and removing friction where possible.
That framework must be seen to be contributing to the safety and
welfare of both communities if there is to be acceptance by
those communities of these efforts.
REBUILD CONFIDENCE
The historic handshake between Chairman Arafat and the late
Prime Minister Rabin at the White House in September 1993
symbolized the expectation of both parties that the door to the
peaceful resolution of differences had been opened. Despite the
current violence and mutual loss of trust, both communities have
repeatedly expressed a desire for peace. Channeling this desire
into substantive progress has proved difficult. The restoration
of trust is essential, and the parties should take affirmative
steps to this end. Given the high level of hostility and
mistrust, the timing and sequence of these steps are obviously
crucial. This can be decided only by the parties. We urge them
to begin the process of decision immediately.
Terrorism: In the September 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, the
parties pledged to take action against "any threat or act of
terrorism, violence or incitement." Although all three
categories of hostilities are reprehensible, it was no accident
that "terrorism" was placed at the top of the list.
Terrorism involves the deliberate killing and injuring of
randomly selected noncombatants for political ends. It seeks to
promote a political outcome by spreading terror and
demoralization throughout a population. It is immoral and
ultimately self-defeating. We condemn it and we urge that the
parties coordinate their security efforts to eliminate it.
In its official submissions and briefings, the GOI has accused
the PA of supporting terrorism by releasing incarcerated
terrorists, by allowing PA security personnel to abet, and in
some cases to conduct terrorist operations, and by terminating
security cooperation with the GOI The PA vigorously denies the
accusations. But Israelis hold the view that the PA's leadership
has made no real effort over the past seven months to prevent
anti-Israeli terrorism. The belief is, in and of itself, a major
obstacle to the rebuilding of confidence.
We believe that the PA has a responsibility to help rebuild
confidence by making clear to both communities that terrorism is
reprehensible and unacceptable, and by taking all measures to
prevent terrorist operations and to punish perpetrators. This
effort should include immediate steps to apprehend and
incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA's jurisdiction.
Settlements: The GOI also has a responsibility to help rebuild
confidence. A cessation of Palestinian-Israeli violence will be
particularly hard to sustain unless the GOI freezes all
settlement construction activity. The GOI should also give
careful consideration to whether settlements that are focal
points for substantial friction are valuable bargaining chips
for future negotiations or provocations likely to preclude the
onset of productive talks.
The issue is, of course, controversial. Many Israelis will
regard our recommendation as a statement of the obvious, and
will support it. Many will oppose it. But settlement activities
must not be allowed to undermine the restoration of calm and the
resumption of negotiations.
During the half-century of its existence, Israel has had the
strong support of the United States. In international forums,
the U.S. has at times cast the only vote on Israel's behalf.
Yet, even in such a close relationship there are some
differences. Prominent among those differences is the U.S.
Government's long-standing opposition to the GOI's policies and
practices regarding settlements. As the then-Secretary of State,
James A. Baker, III, commented on May 22, 1991:
Every time I have gone to Israel in connection with the peace
process, on each of my four trips, I have been met with the
announcement of new settlement activity. This does violate
United States policy. It's the first thing that Arabs Arab
Governments, the first thing that the Palestinians in the
territories whose situation is really quite desperate the
first thing they raise when we talk to them. I don't think there
is any bigger obstacle to peace than the settlement activity
that continues not only unabated but at an enhanced pace.24
The policy described by Secretary Baker, on behalf of the
Administration of President George H. W. Bush, has been, in
essence, the policy of every American administration over the
past quarter century.25
Most other countries, including Turkey, Norway, and those of the
European Union, have also been critical of Israeli settlement
activity, in accordance with their views that such settlements
are illegal under international law and not in compliance with
previous agreements.
On each of our two visits to the region there were Israeli
announcements regarding expansion of settlements, and it was
almost always the first issue raised by Palestinians with whom
we met. During our last visit, we observed the impact of 6,400
settlers on 140,000 Palestinians in Hebron26 and 6,500 settlers
on over 1,100,000 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.27 The GOI
describes its policy as prohibiting new settlements but
permitting expansion of exiting settlements to accommodate
"natural growth." Palestinians contend that there is no
distinction between "new" and "expanded" settlements; and that,
except for a brief freeze during the tenure of Prime Minister
Yitzak Rabin, there has been a continuing, aggressive effort by
Israel to increase the number and size of settlements.
The subject has been widely discussed within Israel. The
Haaretz English Language Edition editorial of April 10, 2001
stated:
A government which seeks to argue that its goal is to reach a
solution to the conflict with the Palestinians through peaceful
means, and is trying at this stage to bring an end to the
violence and terrorism, must announce an end to construction in
the settlements.28
The circumstances in the region are much changed from those
which existed nearly 20 years ago. Yet, President Reagan's words
remain relevant: "The immediate adoption of a settlements freeze
by Israel, more than any other action, could create the
confidence needed..."
Beyond the obvious confidence-building qualities of a settlement
freeze, we note that many of the confrontations during this
conflict have occurred at points where Palestinians, settlers,
and security forces protecting the settlers, meet. Keeping both
the peace and these friction points will be very difficult.
Reducing Tension: We were told by both Palestinians and Israelis
that emotions generated by the many recent deaths and funerals
have fueled additional confrontations, and, in effect,
maintained the cycle of violence. We cannot urge one side or the
other to refrain from demonstrations. But both sides must make
clear that violent demonstrations will not be tolerated. We can
and do urge that both sides exhibit a greater respect for human
life when demonstrators confront security personnel. In
addition, a renewed effort to stop the violence might feature,
for a limited time, a "cooling off" period during which public
demonstrations at or near friction points will be discouraged in
order to break the cycle of violence. To the extent that
demonstrations continue, we urge that demonstrators and security
personnel keep their distance from one another to reduce the
potential for lethal confrontation.
Actions and Responses: Members of the Committee staff witnessed
an incident involving stone throwing in Ramallah from the
perspectives, on the ground, of both sides. The people
confronting one another were mostly young men. The absence of
senior leadership on the IDF side was striking. Likewise, the
absence of responsible security and other officials counseling
restraint on the Palestinian side was obvious.
Concerning such confrontations, the GOI takes the position that
"Israel is engaged in an armed conflict short of war. This is
not a civilian disturbance or a demonstration or a riot. It is
characterized by live-fire attacks on a significant scale
[emphasis added] ... [T]he attacks are carried out by a
well-armed and organized militia..."29 Yet, the GOI acknowledges
that of some 9,000 "attacks" by Palestinians against Israelis,
"some 2,700 [about 30 percent] involved the use of automatic
weapons, rifles, hand guns, grenades, [and] explosives of other
kinds."30
Thus, for the first three months of the current uprising, most
incidents did not involve Palestinian use of firearms and
explosives. BTselem reported that, "according to IDF figures,
73 percent of the incidents [from September 29 to December 2,
2000] did not include Palestinian gunfire. Despite this, it was
in these incidents that most of the Palestinians [were] killed
and wounded. . ."31 Altogether, nearly 500 people were killed
and over 10,000 injured over the past seven months; the
overwhelming majority in both categories were Palestinian. Many
of these deaths were avoidable, as were many Israeli deaths.
Israel's characterization of the conflict, as noted above, is
overly broad, for it does not adequately describe the variety of
incidents reported since late September 2000. Moreover, by thus
defining the conflict, the IDF has suspended its policy of
mandating investigations by the Department of Military Police
Investigations whenever a Palestinian in the territories dies at
the hands of an IDF soldier in an incident not involving
terrorism. In the words of the GOI, "Where Israel considers that
there is reason to investigate particular incidents, it does so,
although, given the circumstances of armed conflict, it does not
do so routinely."32 We believe, however, that by abandoning the
blanket "armed conflict short of war" characterization and by
re-instituting mandatory military police investigations, the GOI
could help mitigate deadly violence and help rebuild mutual
confidence. Notwithstanding the danger posed by stone-throwers,
an effort should be made to differentiate between terrorism and
protests.
Controversy has arisen between the parties over what Israel
calls the "targeting of individual enemy combatants."33 The PLO
describes these actions as "extra-judicial executions,"34 and
claims that Israel has engaged in an "assassination policy" that
is "in clear violation of Article 32 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention... ."35 The GOI states that, "whatever action Israel
has taken has been taken firmly within the bounds of the
relevant and accepted principles relating to the conduct of
hostilities."36
With respect to demonstrations, the GOI has acknowledged "that
individual instances of excessive response may have occurred. To
a soldier or a unit coming under Palestinian attack, the
equation is not that of the Israeli army versus some stone
throwing Palestinian protesters. It is a personal equation."37
We understand this concern, particularly since rocks can maim or
even kill. It is no easy matter for a few young soldiers,
confronted by large numbers of hostile demonstrators, to make
fine legal distinctions on the spot. Still, this "personal
equation" must fit within an organizational ethic; in this case,
The Ethical Code of the Israel Defense Forces, which states, in
part:
The sanctity of human life in the eyes of the IDF servicemen
will find expression in all of their actions, in deliberate and
meticulous planning, in safe and intelligent training and in
proper execution of their mission. In evaluating the risk to
self and others, they will use the appropriate standards and
will exercise constant care to limit injury to life to the
extent required to accomplish the mission.38
Those required to respect the IDF ethical code are largely
draftees, as the IDF is a conscript force. Active duty enlisted
personnel, noncommissioned officers and junior officers the
categories most likely to be present at friction points -- are
young, often teenagers. Unless more senior career personnel or
reservists are stationed at friction points, no IDF personnel
present in these sensitive areas have experience to draw upon
from previous violent Israeli-Palestinian confrontations. We
think it is essential, especially in the context of restoring
confidence by minimizing deadly confrontations, that the IDF
deploy more senior, experienced soldiers to these sensitive
points.
There were incidents where IDF soldiers have used lethal force,
including live ammunition and modified metal-cored rubber
rounds, against unarmed demonstrators throwing stones.39 The IDF
should adopt crowd-control tactics that minimize the potential
for deaths and casualties, withdrawing metal-cored rubber rounds
from general use and using instead rubber baton rounds without
metal cores.
We are deeply concerned about the public safety implications of
exchanges of fire between populated areas, in particular between
Israeli settlements and neighboring Palestinian villages.
Palestinian gunmen have directed small arms fire at Israeli
settlements and at nearby IDF positions from within or adjacent
to civilian dwellings in Palestinian areas, thus endangering
innocent, Israeli and Palestinian civilians alike. We condemn
the positioning of gunmen within or near civilian dwellings. The
IDF often responds to such gunfire with heavy caliber weapons,
sometimes resulting in deaths and injuries to innocent
Palestinians. An IDF officer told us at the Ministry of Defense
on March 23, 2001 that, "When shooting comes from a building we
respond, and sometimes there are innocent people in the
building." Obviously, innocent people are injured and killed
during exchanges of this nature.
We urge that such provocations cease and that the IDF exercise
maximum restraint in its responses if they do occur.
Inappropriate or excessive uses of force often lead to
escalation.
We are aware of IDF sensitivities about these subjects. More
than once we were asked: "What about Palestinian rules of
engagement? What about a Palestinian code of ethics for their
military personnel?" These are valid questions.
On the Palestinian side there are disturbing ambiguities in the
basic areas of responsibility and accountability. The lack of
control exercised by the PA over its own security personnel and
armed elements affiliated with the PA leadership is very
troubling. We urge the PA to take all necessary steps to
establish a clear and unchallenged chain of command for armed
personnel operating under its authority. We recommend that the
PA institute and enforce effective standards of conduct and
accountability, both within the uniformed ranks and between the
police and the civilian political leadership to which it
reports.
Incitement: In their submissions and briefings to the Committee,
both sides expressed concerns about hateful language and images
emanating from the other, citing numerous examples of hostile
sectarian and ethnic rhetoric in the Palestinian and Israeli
media, in school curricula and in statements by religious
leaders, politicians and others.
We call on the parties to renew their formal commitments to
foster mutual understanding and tolerance and to abstain from
incitement and hostile propaganda. We condemn hate language and
incitement in all its forms. We suggest that the parties be
particularly cautious about using words in a manner that
suggests collective responsibility.
Economic and Social Impact of Violence: Further restrictions on
the movement of people and goods have been imposed by Israel on
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These closures take three
forms: those which restrict movement between the Palestinian
areas and Israel; those (including curfews) which restrict
movement within the Palestinian areas; and those which restrict
movement from the Palestinian areas to foreign countries. These
measures have disrupted the lives of hundreds of thousands of
Palestinians; they have increased Palestinian unemployment to an
estimated 40 percent, in part by preventing some 140,000
Palestinians from working in Israel; and have stripped away
about one-third of the Palestinian gross domestic product.
Moreover, the transfer of tax and customs duty revenues owed to
the PA by Israel has been suspended, leading to a serious fiscal
crisis in the PA.
Of particular concern to the PA has been the destruction by
Israeli security forces and settlers of tens of thousands of
olive and fruit trees and other agricultural property. The
closures have had other adverse effects, such as preventing
civilians from access to urgent medical treatment and preventing
students from attending school.
The GOI maintains that these measures were taken in order to
protect Israeli citizens from terrorism. Palestinians
characterize these measures as "collective punishment." The GOI
denies the allegation:
Israel has not taken measures that have had an economic impact
simply for the sake of taking such measures or for reasons of
harming the Palestinian economy. The measures have been taken
for reasons of security. Thus, for example, the closure of the
Palestinian territories was taken in order to prevent, or at
least minimize the risks of, terrorist attacks. ... The
Palestinian leadership has made no attempt to control this
activity and bring it to an end.40
Moreover, the GOI points out that violence in the last quarter
of 2000 cost the Israeli economy $1.2 billion (USD), and that
the loss continues at a rate of approximately $150 million (USD)
per month.41
We acknowledge Israel's security concerns. We believe, however,
that the GOI should lift closures, transfer to the PA all
revenues owed, and permit Palestinians who have been employed in
Israel to return to their jobs. Closure policies play into the
hands of extremists seeking to expand their constituencies and
thereby contribute to escalation. The PA should resume
cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure that
Palestinian workers employed within Israel are fully vetted and
free of connections to terrorists and terrorist organizations.
International development assistance has from the start been an
integral part of the peace process, with an aim to strengthen
the socio-economic foundations for peace. This assistance today
is more important than ever. We urge the international community
to sustain the development agenda of the peace process.
Holy Places: It is particularly regrettable that places such as
the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem, Joseph's Tomb in
Nablus, and Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem have been the scenes of
violence, death and injury. These are places of peace, prayer
and reflection which must be accessible to all believers.
Places deemed holy by Muslims, Jews, and Christians merit
respect, protection and preservation. Agreements previously
reached by the parties regarding holy places must be upheld. The
GOI and the PA should create a joint initiative to defuse the
sectarian aspect of their political dispute by preserving and
protecting such places. Efforts to develop inter-faith dialogue
should be encouraged.
International Force: One of the most controversial subjects
raised during our inquiry was the issue of deploying an
international force to the Palestinian areas. The PA is strongly
in favor of having such a force to protect Palestinian civilians
and their property from the IDF and from settlers. The GOI is
just as adamantly opposed to an "international protection
force," believing that it would prove unresponsive to Israeli
security concerns and interfere with bilateral negotiations to
settle the conflict.
We believe that to be effective such a force would need the
support of both parties. We note that international forces
deployed in this region have been or are in a position to
fulfill their mandates and make a positive contribution only
when they were deployed with the consent of all of the parties
involved.
During our visit to Hebron, we were briefed by personnel of the
Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), a presence to
which both parties have agreed. The TIPH is charged with
observing an explosive situation and writing reports on their
observations. If the parties agree, as a confidence-building
measure, to draw upon TIPH personnel to help them manage other
friction points, we hope that TIPH contributors could
accommodate such a request.
Cross-Community Initiatives: Many described to us the near
absolute loss of trust. It was all the more inspiring,
therefore, to find groups (such as the Parent's Circle and the
Economic Cooperation Foundation) dedicated to cross-community
understanding in spite of all that has happened. We commend them
and their important work.
Regrettably, most of the work of this nature has stopped during
the current conflict. To help rebuild confidence, the GOI and PA
should jointly endorse and support the work of Israeli and
Palestinian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) already
involved in confidence-building through initiatives linking both
sides. It is important that the PA and GOI support
cross-community organizations and initiatives, including the
provision of humanitarian assistance to Palestinian villages by
Israeli NGOs. Providing travel permits for participants is
essential. Cooperation between the humanitarian organizations
and the military/security services of the parties should be
encouraged and institutionalized.
Such programs can help build, albeit slowly, constituencies for
peace among Palestinians and Israelis and can provide safety
nets during times of turbulence. Organizations involved in this
work are vital for translating good intentions into positive
actions.
RESUME NEGOTIATIONS
Israeli leaders do not wish to be perceived as "rewarding
violence." Palestinian leaders do not wish to be perceived as
"rewarding occupation." We appreciate the political constraints
on leaders of both sides. Nevertheless, if the cycle of violence
is to be broken and the search for peace resumed, there needs to
be a new bilateral relationship incorporating both security
cooperation and negotiations.
We cannot prescribe to the parties how best to pursue their
political objectives. Yet the construction of a new bilateral
relationship solidifying and transcending an agreed cessation of
violence requires intelligent risk-taking. It requires, in the
first instance, that each party again be willing to regard the
other as a partner. Partnership, in turn, requires at this
juncture something more than was agreed in the Declaration of
Principles and in subsequent agreements. Instead of declaring
the peace process to be "dead," the parties should determine how
they will conclude their common journey along their agreed "road
map," a journey which began in Madrid and continued in spite
of problems until very recently.
To define a starting point is for the parties to decide. Both
parties have stated that they remain committed to their mutual
agreements and undertakings. It is time to explore further
implementation. The parties should declare their intention to
meet on this basis, in order to resume full and meaningful
negotiations, in the spirit of their undertakings at Sharm
el-Sheikh in 1999 and 2000.
Neither side will be able to achieve its principal objectives
unilaterally or without political risk. We know how hard it is
for leaders to act especially if the action can be
characterized by political opponents as a concession without
getting something in return. The PA must as it has at previous
critical junctures take steps to reassure Israel on security
matters. The GOI must as it has in the past take steps to
reassure the PA on political matters. Israelis and Palestinians
should avoid, in their own actions and attitudes, giving
extremists, common criminals and revenge seekers the final say
in defining their joint future. This will not be easy if deadly
incidents occur in spite of effective cooperation.
Notwithstanding the daunting difficulties, the very foundation
of the trust required to re-establish a functioning partnership
consists of each side making such strategic reassurances to the
other.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The GOI and the PA must act swiftly and decisively to halt the
violence. Their immediate objectives then should be to rebuild
confidence and resume negotiations. What we are asking is not
easy. Palestinians and Israelis not just their leaders, but
two publics at large have lost confidence in one another. We
are asking political leaders to do, for the sake of their
people, the politically difficult: to lead without knowing how
many will follow.
During this mission our aim has been to fulfill the mandate
agreed at Sharm el-Sheikh. We value the support given our work
by the participants at the summit, and we commend the parties
for their cooperation. Our principal recommendation is that they
recommit themselves to the Sharm el-Sheikh spirit, and that they
implement the decisions made there in 1999 and 2000. We believe
that the summit participants will support bold action by the
parties to achieve these objectives.
END THE VIOLENCE
The GOI and the PA should reaffirm their commitment to existing
agreements and undertakings and should immediately implement an
unconditional cessation of violence.
Anything less than a complete effort by both parties to end the
violence will render the effort itself ineffective, and will
likely be interpreted by the other side as evidence of hostile
intent.
The GOI and PA should immediately resume security cooperation.
Effective bilateral cooperation aimed at preventing violence
will encourage the resumption of negotiations. We are
particularly concerned that, absent effective, transparent
security cooperation, terrorism and other acts of violence will
continue and may be seen as officially sanctioned whether they
are or not. The parties should consider widening the scope of
security cooperation to reflect the priorities of both
communities and to seek acceptance for these efforts from those
communities.
We acknowledge the PA's position that security cooperation
presents a political difficulty absent a suitable political
context, i.e., the relaxation of stringent Israeli security
measures combined with ongoing, fruitful negotiations. We also
acknowledge the PA's fear that, with security cooperation in
hand, the GOI may not be disposed to deal forthrightly with
Palestinian political concerns. We believe that security
cooperation cannot long be sustained if meaningful negotiations
are unreasonably deferred, if security measures "on the ground"
are seen as hostile, or if steps are taken that are perceived as
provocative or as prejudicing the outcome of negotiations.
REBUILD CONFIDENCE
The PA and GOI should work together to establish a meaningful
"cooling off period" and implement additional confidence
building measures, some of which were proposed in the October
2000 Sharm el-Sheikh Statement and some of which were offered by
the U.S. on January 7, 2001 in Cairo.
The PA and GOI should resume their efforts to identify, condemn
and discourage incitement in all its forms.
The PA should make clear through concrete action to Palestinians
and Israelis alike that terrorism is reprehensible and
unacceptable, and that the PA will make a 100 percent effort to
prevent terrorist operations and to punish perpetrators. This
effort should include immediate steps to apprehend and
incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA's jurisdiction.
The GOI should freeze all settlement activity, including the
"natural growth" of existing settlements.
The kind of security cooperation desired by the GOI cannot for
long co-exist with settlement activity described very recently
by the European Union as causing "great concern" and by the U.S.
as "provocative."
The GOI should give careful consideration to whether settlements
which are focal points for substantial friction are valuable
bargaining chips for future negotiations or provocations likely
to preclude the onset of productive talks.
The GOI may wish to make it clear to the PA that a future peace
would pose no threat to the territorial contiguity of a
Palestinian State to be established in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip.
The IDF should consider withdrawing to positions held before
September 28, 2000 which will reduce the number of friction
points and the potential for violent confrontations.
The GOI should ensure that the IDF adopt and enforce policies
and procedures encouraging non-lethal responses to unarmed
demonstrators, with a view to minimizing casualties and friction
between the two communities. The IDF should:
Re-institute, as a matter of course, military police
investigations into Palestinian deaths resulting from IDF
actions in the Palestinian territories in incidents not
involving terrorism. The IDF should abandon the blanket
characterization of the current uprising as "an armed conflict
short of war," which fails to discriminate between terrorism and
protest.
Adopt tactics of crowd-control that minimize the potential for
deaths and casualties, including the withdrawal of metal-cored
rubber rounds from general use.
Ensure that experienced, seasoned personnel are present for duty
at all times at known friction points.
Ensure that the stated values and standard operating procedures
of the IDF effectively instill the duty of caring for
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as Israelis
living there, consistent with The Ethical Code of The IDF.
The GOI should lift closures, transfer to the PA all tax
revenues owed, and permit Palestinians who had been employed in
Israel to return to their jobs; and should ensure that security
forces and settlers refrain from the destruction of homes and
roads, as well as trees and other agricultural property in
Palestinian areas. We acknowledge the GOI's position that
actions of this nature have been taken for security reasons.
Nevertheless, their economic effects will persist for years.
The PA should renew cooperation with Israeli security agencies
to ensure, to the maximum extent possible, that Palestinian
workers employed within Israel are fully vetted and free of
connections to organizations and individuals engaged in
terrorism.
The PA should prevent gunmen from using Palestinian populated
areas to fire upon Israeli populated areas and IDF positions.
This tactic places civilians on both sides at unnecessary risk.
The GOI and IDF should adopt and enforce policies and procedures
designed to ensure that the response to any gunfire emanating
from Palestinian populated areas minimizes the danger to the
lives and property of Palestinian civilians, bearing in mind
that it is probably the objective of gunmen to elicit an
excessive IDF response.
The GOI should take all necessary steps to prevent acts of
violence by settlers.
The parties should abide by the provisions of the Wye River
Agreement prohibiting illegal weapons.
The PA should take all necessary steps to establish a clear and
unchallenged chain of command for armed personnel operating
under its authority.
The PA should institute and enforce effective standards of
conduct and accountability, both within the uniformed ranks and
between the police and the civilian political leadership to
which it reports.
The PA and GOI should consider a joint undertaking to preserve
and protect holy places sacred to the traditions of Muslims,
Jews, and Christians. An initiative of this nature might help to
reverse a disturbing trend: the increasing use of religious
themes to encourage and justify violence.
The GOI and PA should jointly endorse and support the work of
Palestinian and Israeli non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
involved in cross-community initiatives linking the two peoples.
It is important that these activities, including the provision
of humanitarian aid to Palestinian villages by Israeli NGOs,
receive the full backing of both parties.
RESUME NEGOTIATIONS
We reiterate our belief that a 100 percent effort to stop the
violence, an immediate resumption of security cooperation and an
exchange of confidence building measures are all important for
the resumption of negotiations. Yet none of these steps will
long be sustained absent a return to serious negotiations.
It is not within our mandate to prescribe the venue, the basis
or the agenda of negotiations. However, in order to provide an
effective political context for practical cooperation between
the parties, negotiations must not be unreasonably deferred and
they must, in our view, manifest a spirit of compromise,
reconciliation and partnership, notwithstanding the events of
the past seven months.
In the spirit of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreements and
understandings of 1999 and 2000, we recommend that the parties
meet to reaffirm their commitment to signed agreements and
mutual understandings, and take corresponding action. This
should be the basis for resuming full and meaningful
negotiations. The parties are at a crossroads. If they do not
return to the negotiating table, they face the prospect of
fighting it out for years on end, with many of their citizens
leaving for distant shores to live their lives and raise their
children. We pray they make the right choice. That means
stopping the violence now. Israelis and Palestinians have to
live, work, and prosper together. History and geography have
destined them to be neighbors. That cannot be changed. Only when
their actions are guided by this awareness will they be able to
develop the vision and reality of peace and shared prosperity.
Suleyman Demirel
9th President of the Republic of Turkey
Thorbjoern Jagland
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway
George J. Mitchell, Chairman
Former Member and Majority Leader of the United States Senate
Warren B. Rudman
Former Member of the United States Senate
Javier Solana
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
European Union.
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