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Security Council Resolution 242 by Professor Dr. Ahmad Tell In November 1967, the Security Council convened at Egypt’s request in order to examine Israel’s withdrawal from the territories it had occupied in June of that year. Two draft resolutions were discussed. The first was submitted by the US on November 7 and the second was submitted by Britain on November 16, 1967. The only difference between the two drafts was the emphasis of the latter on “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.” The British draft was adopted on November 22, 1967 and became known as resolution 242. The main provisions of Resolution 242 Resolution 242 purported to lay down a formula for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. It emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and affirmed that the fulfillment of the principles of the Charter required the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
The resolution further affirmed the necessity:
Finally, the resolution requested the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contact with the states concerned, in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement in accordance with the principles of the resolution. Israel’s Equivocation Dr. Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish Ambassador to Moscow, was appointed by the Secretary-General of the UN as his Special Representative to implement Security Council Resolution 242. However, his efforts bore no fruit, on account of Israel’s refusal to withdraw, or to give an undertaking to withdraw, from the territories it had occupied. Israel formally informed Ambassador Jarring on January 26, 1971 that it refused to withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines. Israel’s equivocation about Resolution 242 is remarkable. Originally Israel used its influence with the US Government to secure its adoption because it was obviously for its benefit: The Palestinian Question would be practically disposed of by becoming simply a refugee problem; the territorial issue would be reduced to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, that is to say, to 20 per cent of the area of Palestine; and finally, Israel would be accepted by the Arab world and its sovereignty affirmed over 80 per cent of Palestine. However, when the question of the implementation of the resolution arose, Israel formally informed Ambassador Jarring on January 26, 1971 that it refused to withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines. According to Israel’s interpretation, the provision in resolution 242 for Israel’s withdrawal from territories occupied in the recent conflict does not mean what it says and does not require withdrawal from all occupied territories. The Arab states attended a summit meeting in Khartoum on August 29, 1967 to discuss the consequences of the 1967 war. The Arab leaders took a decision that the liberation of the occupied Arab lands is the responsibility of all the Arab states, and of securing the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories by political action on international level within the following three principles: (1) No peace with Israel. (2) No recognition of Israel. (3) No negotiations with Israel. Incompatibility with International Law In fact, by resolution 242, the Security Council sought to dispose of the Palestine Question in a manner incompatible with international law and UN resolutions. The resolution meant recognition of Israel’s sovereignty over the territory of Palestine which it occupied in 1948 and 1949 in excess of the area of the Jewish State as defined by the UN in 1947. Hence, the Security Council did not thereby conform to international law, to the principles of the UN Charter or to the General Assembly Resolution 181 of November 29, 1947. To this should be added the fact that Israel did not then, and does not now, possess recognized boundaries, the Armistice Agreements of 1949 laid down armistice lines, not final political boundaries, and expressly reserved the rights, claims and positions of the parties in an ultimate peaceful settlement. By confining the Israeli withdrawal to the armistice lines that existed prior to the aggression of June 1967, the Security Council was, therefore, treating such armistice lines as definitive political boundaries contrary to the intention of the parties in the Armistice agreements and to the accepted meaning of armistice lines in international law. The Resolution 242 purported to ratify Israel’s conquests of Palestinian in excess of the partition resolution of 1947. June 1, 1999 Professor Dr. Ahmad Tell, of Jordanian origin, is Dean of Zarka Private National Community College. In 1980 he received an Award of Distinction from the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education. He is the author of several books and publications: Higher Education in Jordan , published in 1997, including Abdullah Tell, the Hero and Why Did the Arabs Fail?, both of which are currently under print. Dr. Tell also wrote a research paper about the former Prime Minister Samir Rifai and the Palestinian cause in 1997. He was an officer in the Arab Legion from 1946-1950 and fought in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948.
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