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Over
the last year ‘Breaking the Silence’ has collected testimonies given
by hundreds of IOF (Israeli Defense Forces) soldiers who served in
the territories during the last conflict. These testimonies reveal
the impossible reality those soldiers have to face, and the terrible
moral price this reality demands. Selected collections from those
testimonies have been published in testimonial collections produced
by ‘Breaking the Silence’.
The
present collection is not just one more testimonial-collection,
revealing the brutal routine of the territories’ reality, or the
constant moral degradation and erosion of soldiers’ values. The
collection focuses on IOF orders, rules of engagement and
operational procedures. It presents a grave picture of evidently
illegal orders given frequently, and in different times and places:
firing at civilians who pose no risk, revenge operations,
intentionally shooting at rescue-forces, and more. This collection
reveals the depth of the military administration’s moral corruption,
and the dimness of moral sense, which has spread to the highest
ranks. The testimonies in this collection concerns various units
that were operative in the territories in different times and at
different places, and is thus an evidence for the magnitude of the
moral decay, and for the depths to which flawed norms have diffused.
It
is also apparent that the IOF’s self-inspection system has failed to
fulfill its duty. This also applies to the civilian and
parliamentary inspection mechanisms, which, during the last
confrontations, have consistently refrained from criticizing the
army’s mode of conduct in general, and its rules of engagement in
particular. This brings out sharply an urgent need to create a
platform on which the information we have gathered here can be
presented, in order to examine what this information teaches, as
well as the IOF’s mode of conduct during the last confrontations. A
civilized and decent society cannot survive without a continuous
inspection and criticism of the most powerful organization operating
within it. ‘Breaking the Silence’ is therefore calling for the
establishment of an independent public inspection committee, which
will enable a responsible disclosure and examination of the facts.
Listening and taking responsibility is the very least that is
required of society and its representatives in a civilized and
decent society founded on basic moral values.
Bombarding the Shoreline
The witness:
Captain (Reserve), Navy.
The Location:
Gaza Strip
Date:
First two weeks of operation ‘Defense
Shield’
Description:
I
served in the (Israel) Navy as a commander of an armed high-speed
reconnaissance boat (‘Devorah’). I had some operated cannon on
board, one of whose functions was to bombard the shoreline. There
was a plan to be put into action, if necessitated by circumstances,
of bombarding specific targets on the shoreline of Gaza. And such
circumstances arose. The Plan was not put into action earlier, but
as operation ‘Defense Shield’ evolved, the battle plan was carried
out.
Before that, I would like to state that the following is my
recollection, in other words, I am telling it from my vantage point.
All facts mentioned represent my point of view that is the vantage
point of the captain of the boat.
(Before the operation began) the Deputy Naval Commander and
representatives of the other forces taking part in the (‘Defensive
Shield’) operations planned for each day, gathered for the
briefing. Such meetings took place every evening during the
following week or two, and included representatives of the Navy, of
the Air Force, of Helicopter units, and of various participating
combat units, myself, representing the boat as well as people from
units on the shore, Intelligence, etc.. The gist of the meetings was
to stress the fact that all of us were now partners in combat. I had
the feeling that a green light was given for an operation with a
wide participation of IOF’s combat units.
‘He’
said ‘I want two dead every night’, presumably from the shoreline
under attack. ‘I want at least two ‘terrorists’ every night’
Who said that?
The
Deputy Naval Commander at the time.
Did he say terrorists? Did he say dead?
I
don’t remember exactly his choice of words. I had a feeling that
this (command) shouldn’t have been given that way. In other words,
there is an objective. If it's achieved, fine. If not, than so be
it. You can’t specify you want so many victims every night as this
gives you a feeling of revenge, of a revenge mission, to return,
say, with 4 (dead) Palestinians . That’s it. And then plan the
operation… Intelligence provided every time new targets, featuring
(the renowned Palestinian) ‘Force 17’. Here was a target… there was
a (Palestinian) position…, all sorts of positions and targets on the
Gaza shore. All these were of course targets designated as ‘hostile
sabotage activities’. Everything contained in these targets was of
that category. Every person within the target area, if armed, (and
every person in the target area was assumed to be of course armed),
was a legitimate target. All together, we shot about 2 or 3 times on
these targets. We couldn’t see any people the first time and hence
we did not have a legitimate target. We did see one guard, two
guards, but you need a concentration of people at the target site
for shooting to be effective.
The bombardment was not accurate?
It
was not sufficiently accurate. To shoot at a single person is
obviously ineffective as you most likely will miss. Even if you hit,
it's only a single person. In brief, there was some sort of
(Palestinian) patrol on (the Gaza) shore and we waited for the
duration of the night for a ‘better constellation’ (an opportunity
to shoot).
There
are usually units of Naval Task Force 13 (a Naval commando unit)
closer to the targets who then report whether or not there are
armed (Palestinian) people around and provide data by means of
night-vision instruments. The Ashdod base commander, Col. ***
was aboard that night, and being the highest ranking officer aboard,
he had to give clearance before we could start firing. One of the
days the Chief of Naval Operations, Gen *** was aboard.
On
your boat?
Yes.
Briefly, that evening we spotted a patrol on the shore that went
down to the beach outside our target area, on the beach itself.
About 3-4 people sat there at the beach and lit some fire and we
noted some action between the (Patrol) group and the fire. This
meant that someone armed came to the beach, exchanged weapons and
sat down by the fire. We got the impression that the bonfire was lit
by people who were part of the patrol and that there was movement
with weapons from the position on the shore. This implied that if
the people in the position were engaged in ‘hostile sabotage
activities’ then those sitting around the fire were of the same
kind. We had no other identification of these people, no idea who
they were, whether they were armed or not, we just didn’t know.
Naval
Task Force 13 signaled that they saw weapons at the site. Under
these circumstances, I as the boat’s commander, ordered to shoot as
the target appeared legitimate. I wanted to shoot, wanted to carry
out the shooting from a boat that hadn’t engaged in combat for a
long time or killed a saboteur, and this represented a real
opportunity. All of us (on the boat) felt very excited. Night after
night boats returned from nightly duty without firing a single shot,
and now we had such an opportunity. Our feeling was imbued by the
aura of ‘Defensive Shield’, the (suicide) attacks preceding it and
the tension. No wonder I wanted to shoot. I said ‘legitimate target’
and on that had the occurrence of all other ranks up to the rank of
the one giving the order. And we started firing. Now, in retrospect,
I have doubts whether my order was justified as we really didn’t
have a clue at whom we were shooting. We saw people getting hit,
others- pulling wounded away, seeking cover behind sand dunes while
we continued shooting aiming at hitting as many as possible, even
those carrying the wounded. The problematic issue was that we didn’t
really know who sat around the fire. It could have been the kid
brother of someone who sat there, it could have been… we don’t know.
They were figures to us, black figures in a …..
And that was based on Task Force 13’s report that they were armed?
Yes,
supported by our spotting of an armed person within the target area.
We saw a connection between the two groups (one at the target area
and one at the bonfire) which gave rise to the decision: it’s OK.
Let’s go it’s alright! We were all aching for a bombardment at that
time. After all we wanted to provide 2 bodies every night. That’s
all.
Look,
every day and night we faced the same problem: is he armed or isn’t
he. Was that a jeep? Did you spot anyone entering? Armed or not?
What’s he doing? And they (Task Force 13) provided the most reliable
info. We asked them time and time again (for verification). The guy
who was on my boat asked them: ‘Wait a minute- could you see them
accurately? What’s here, what’s there? What exactly do you see?
Where did the jeep stop? What was it doing? Every time to suspect
and to decide whether the target was legitimate or not.
The
story continued on. We bombarded again, in cooperation with attack
choppers. This time the target was to shoot at escapees. And again,
without any positive identification of the figures we were shooting
at. And lately, there’s been no distinction between armed and
unarmed people. You don’t know who is there. People from surrounding
areas have started to come, helping the injured, while we continue
shooting at the same area. We don’t aim at anyone specifically, but
we shoot at running figures with an objective of hitting as many as
possible, like in a Video game. Click, click, click! That’s it. And
we had permission for what we did. I repeat; as a commander of my
boat I wanted to shoot under the circumstances. In my eyes that was
legitimate. Otherwise I would have refused, saying that it was not
legitimate and would not have given the order to shoot. It passed
all ranks, and in their eyes it was legitimate. Now I see the whole
issue as problematic. Very problematic.
In
this particular instance (when you fired) was there a higher ranking
officer on board?
Yes,
I recall it was the Chief of Naval Operations.
Did he give the order to fire? Was he in contact with Task Force 13
?
There
was a ranking officer on board, who also had contact with the Kirya
(General Staff Headquarters). The actual ordering authority could
have been mine, approved, I think by the Chief of Naval Operations,
or the Deputy Chief, as the case may be. The highest ranking officer
could possible be sitting in the Kirya, but there is someone who
directs operation at sea. And that goes up through all ranks, till
the ……. I think it’s the chief of Naval Operations who authorizes
the shooting.
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